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IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIAN FEDERALISM
Arjun Krishnan & Vishnu Vardhan Shankar*

I

Introduction
'We do not know what we are handmg our,
we do not know to whom we ar handing ourahat we hand otwr
and we do not know how what we handover wil be ased "

Federalism has traditionally been viewed from the prism of 'DualFederaisd,in which local and national
governments are said to be in an adversarial relationship, and the purpose of the Constitution is to

demarcate their respective spheres of operation so as to avoid conflict between them. Professor Dicey
has expressed this in the following terms "Whatever concersthe nation
asiawhokshouldbeplacedunderthecontrolof the nationalgovernment.
All matters, which arenotprimarn4 of common interest, should remain in the hands of the several
States... "'
However, in light of industrial growth and the expanding needs of commerce and international relations,
there has emerged a need for effective and united governance for every State.3 Thus the focus of federal
relations has shifted from an adversarial relationship between Centre and States to a more cooperative
model.' The Constitution is no longer seen as a mere instrument of avoiding conflict but also as an
instrument to ensure effective collaborative governance.
Legislative relations between the Centre and States are at the core of every federal system. The Indian
Constitution embodies this principle in Article 246, which demarcates the legislative powers of the

IV Year B.A., LL.B. (Hons), National Law School of India University Bangalore. The authors would like to thank Dr. Udai
Raj Rai, Justice VR. Krishna lyer Professor of Public Law and Policy Choice, National Law School of India University,
Bangalore, for his critical insights on the subject. Mr. A.L Somaaji, Mr. Sriam Panchu, Mr. Gopal Subamanium & Mr.
Gounb K. Banerji, Senior Advocates, Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Advocate and the Partners at M/s Aiyar & Dolia, Chennai,
were also helpful in more ways than one.
The Hon'ble Mr. Steel Hall, Member of the Parliament of South Australia, 1967, in the context of a proposed reference of
a matter within the State's legislative competence to the Commonwealth under Section 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution of
Australia citedfrom. Graeme A. R. Johnson, The Reference Power in the Austahan Consttdon, 9) MET.B. UNIv. L. REv. 42 (1973)
[hereinafter JOHNSON]

AX DicEa, AN INTRoDITION

TO TohI SmDY OF THE CONSTornN

143 (1965)

R. DUCAT, ConrnmoNAL INTSRPRETATION: PowERs or GOVERNMENT 8 273 (2000), See alo ASOK CRANDA,
FEDERALShi IN INDIA: A Stany or UNIoN-STATE RELATIONs 93-95 (1965) [hereinafter CHANDA]. See general R.L. WArrs,
NEw FEDERALisM EXPERIENTS IN THE COMIONWERAfH (1966).
See 1 CRAI

For an analysis of the differences between 'classical' and 'cooperative federalism', see CHANoA PAr., CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS
& CooPERTvE FEDERALsiM 22-25 (1983) [hereinafter CHANORA PAL].

68

CooperadveL4ghion andArde 252
Centre and the States. Both the Centre and the States are sovereign in their respective legislative spheres
and are prohibited from overreaching their powers. The rigid balance between the Centre and States that
is so created is at the heart of the federal structure of the Indian policy and can be altered only in
exceptional situations.' One such exceptional situation is the use of Article 252.' Under this Article, the
passing of resolutions by two or more State Legislatures enables Parliament to make laws on subjects not
originally in the Union List and make it applicable to those States that passed the resolution or later
adopted it in like manner.
One of the basic tenets of federalism is the independence of Federal and Provincial/State legislatures in
their own spheres.8 However, there may be situations where the rigid separation of powers between
Centre and States may have to be diluted to better serve public interest. Uniform legislation may have to
be enacted through the cooperative legislative framework to address issues that cannot be dealt with by
individual States. Thus, cooperative legislation and transfer of power provisions like Article 252 lend
much needed flexibility to federal systems. Therefore, there are two competing interests - the need to
have flexibility in federal relations, and the need to maintain the independence and legislative sovereignty
of states in their respective spheres. The reason for conflict is that cooperative legislative schemes usually
imply the expansion of the legislative powers of the one federal unit (usually the Centre) at the expense
of the other (usually the States). The need to balance these competing interests is an issue that informs
much of the discussion in this article.
'Cooperative Lgisladon' in a federal system of government refers to the practice of relaxation of the strict
principle that the Central and State legislatures should act independent of each other and within their
own respective legislative spheres. This paper deals with the implications of Article 252 as a cooperative
legislative scheme for federalism in India. There is a lack of clarity with respect to some aspects of
interpretation of Article 252 coupled with a scarcity of secondary literature on the subject. An example

SeegenernAlKC. MARKANDAN, SARKAIA COMMISSON & CONSTIlTIONAL PERSP'ECTIVE 149-167 (1991). The sublect matter of

legislation is placed in Three Lists in the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution, namely the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists.
Padiament has exclusive authority to legislate on the Union List whereas the State Legislatures have exclusive authority to
legislate on the State List, while both Centre and State may legislate on the Concurrent List.
See S.R Bommai v. Union of Inh, AIR. 1994 S.C. 1918,1976-1979 (paras 65-66), per P.S Sawant,J.

Article 252 reads as under:
Article 252: Power of Parliament to Legislate for two or more States by consent and adoption of such legislation by any other
State -

1) If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which
Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in Arts. 249 and 250 should be regulated in such
States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those
States, it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so passed shall
apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the
House or where there are two Houses, by each of the houses of Legislature of that State.
2)

Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act of Parliament passed or adopted in like manner
but shall not, as respect any State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the legislature of that State.

See Union of India v. S.R Bsrnam,AI 51994 SC. 1918,2053-2054 (para 211), per B.P Jeeran Reddy, J., and at 1978-1979 (para
66), per PB SawantJ.
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of the contemporary televance of such a study is also evident in light of the recent proposals for the use
of Article 252 with respect to controversial legislation on the subject of a cow-slaughter ban in India.
Part II of the paper-deals with those situations that have merited cooperative legislation with particular
reference to the Indian Constitution. A provision such as Artide 252 is unique and has few parallels in
other constitutions.1' In order to understand the implications of such a provision for federalism, it
therefore becomes necessary to place Article 252 in the context of cooperative legislative schemes in
other federal constitutions. Wherever appropriate, the position in the Indian Constitution is compared
with that in other constitutions. Part III therefore, is a comparison of various models of cooperative
legislation in different parts of the world. Parts IV to VI analyze in detail, the shift in the balance between
federal and state powers once a resolution is passed under Article 252. The issue is of great relevance
where there is a conflict between an existing State law and a law passed under Article 252 by the Parliament.
So far, the primary course of action adopted by the courts in India has been to avoid any such conflict by
reading down either the resolution passed by the States or the legislation enacted in pursuance thereof.
However, where such conflict is clear and unavoidable, courts have had to deal with the same. A close
reading of judicial dicta in this regard gives rise to much confusion as to the status of matters that are
transferred in pursuance of a resolution passed under Article 252(1). Part V also includes a discussion on
whether the Parliament can be compelled to enact a law in pursuance of a resolution passed under
Article 252. Finally, the authors attempt to arrive at an ideal model for the Indian scenario.
During the course of this paper, the authors have used the device of 'hypotheticalconstuadons' in order to
simplify complex facts and issues, The'4ypotheicalconstitution'scheme is based on the following assumptions:
the hypothetical constitution is in pai materki with the constitution being examined. For instance, the
hypothetical Indian Constitution would have a cooperative legislative provision identical to Article 252.
Importantly, in the 'hypothedralconsuhion , the States would have exclusive legislative dominion (in the
Indian context the 'StateLid) over the following legislative Entries, "EntrgX: 'K, ., M',Enty Y. 1, B, C,
D2"Also, in the hypothetical scenario, the States desire a common legislation to cover legislative subjects
C and D (Entry Y), which he within their own exclusive legislative domain. Under different constitutions
there are different mechanisms for expressing' this need. For instance in the hypothetical Indian
Constitution, the standard format of the relevant portion of the resolution of the State Legislature
adopdg an Act passed by Parliament under Article 252(1) may read:

a... the controland regulation of C,D and allothermatters inddentaland ami/arythereto shall in
the State of -lie reulated by the CD At 20xx passed by Parkanent.."

P. Sunderarajan, Cenirs io write to States on eon' slaughtr ban Arm (2003), at httn:/Imvww
2003050708580100 htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) [hcreinafter SUNDEiRARAJANI.

hehindu con/2003/05/07/stoie/

DuKne DAs Bisu, CoPAaA'nva FErsmusM 159-160 (1987) |1bereinaftrer BAsu, COMPRAATVE
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The Need for Cooperative Legislation

Even in a federation, there arises a need for collective and cooperative action by the Federal and State
governments." There are three main possible motives for legislative cooperation of the kind contemplated
by Article 252 of the Indian Constitution."
Firs/ , the S Lates may realize that uniformity on a particular subject is desirable. An important example of
a situation where the need for uniformity has prompted legislation is the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976. Problems faced by State Governments in administering ceiling laws included
difficulty in dealing with properties an individual spread across States and the disparities in procedure for
acquisition and compensation. Enacting such legislation under Article 252 meant that evasion became
more difficult and there was uniformity of procedure across States."
The secondpossible reason for the use of Article 252 may be awareness on the part of the States that the
problem cannot be dealt with at the State level and requires legislation covering several States. One
prominent example of such legislation is the Prize Competitions Act, 1955. In 1948, the Bombay Legislature
passed a law with the object of controlling and taxing lotteries and prize competitions. However, this did
not stop persons outside the State of Bombay from receiving entries and remittances from within the
State. in order to prevent evasion, the provisions of the Bombay law were extended to these persons by
an amendment. However, the Bombay High Court ruled that the amendment was altri tires Article 301
of the Constitution, which dealt with freedom of inter-state trade and comnmerce." Unable to regulate
the activity, several State legislatures passed resolutions under Article 252 authorizing Parliament to pass
legislation for the control and regulation of prize competitions. The result was the Prize Competitions
Act, 1955 passed by the Parliament. 5 This is an example of using Article 252 to deal with issues affecting
several States and which individual States cannot deal with) 6 In Australia, the inability of States to

handle issues at the State level has led to references to the Commonwealth with respect to post-war
reconstruction activities, air navigation corporation law and trade practices'"

For a detaied discussion for the need for cooperative federalism retCwanAr, spra note 3, at 94. See akr CHANDRA PAi,
note 4, at 94.

a93ra

1NliNs' FEDaRaLIsi- A Co.iPARAnm STuox 85-86 (1992) [hereinafter VENKATARAMAIAH]. See alrm
Alice Jacob, CentrediateGoernmentalReladons in Indian FderalSyrem,in THE UNION & T-EI STATEs 34 (S.N Jain, Subhash C.
Kashyap & N. Srinivasan eds., 1972) [hereinafter JACOB].

'See RS. VNKATARAMAH,

"

See Uion of idiav 1 13 Chwowmkar, AI.R. 1979 S.C. 1415, 1418 (para 2), where it is stated that "...One merit of such Central
kgislahon ir that property owned by famikes anyntere in Inldi can be aggrgatedfor kisation purpore, and the basis of acquislion and
compensadion tan be uniform all oer the county..."
"Soe RM D Chamnarbau

//ahv. State of Bombq-, A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 1.

It may be pertinent to note that the Bombay High Court's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in State of Bomay

LALD. Chardmamhnaa, AJ.R. 1957 S.C 699, thus obviating the need for the Prize Competition Act, 1955 itself.
'

The use of Article 252 in the instant situation Found approval in the judgment of Venkmararna Ayyar, J., in R.ALD.C v. Union
of lnda, (19 57) S.CJ. 593, 598 - "Therpoxition creatdby thisjadgment (roerring io thejdgwent of the Bombay FI-gh Cori in RLD.C
a S/af tnhbay,A IR 1956 Bam. 1) aar Il Aboogh Sates aoed rgiete .. aihin tAir reretie bordern, to tbe extent that it had
rnfeaionsin other Stas tay weitd deal aib it oione4 on4 hyjint andcoertedaction among therkes.That predse is the situationjor
ahmhArik 252{fpr
ides.." See K DuncA DMs BASU, COMMWNAnYON wnmCoNsrrurnoN or INDIA 135 (1986) |hereinahfer
BAsU, CommatrYa]|.

1

Jon\sn,

eyjra note

1, at 54-56.
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Lcett, individual States may not have sufficient resources to deal with a problem, while the Union may be
better equipped to deal with the issue in this regard.? The value of such a provision in the Constitution
was appreciated in the debates the Constituent Assembly while discussing Draft Article 229" (which
corresponds to present-day Article 252)." The need for legislation of the sort contemplated by Article
252 was recognised even before Independence,"' and after the framing and enactment of the Constitution
in 1950, laws of considerable importance have been passed in pursuance of Article 252? Some authors
have also commented that Article 252 has not been used to its full potential, partly because the same
objectives are often achieved by using extra-constitutional agencies such as the Planning Commission
and numerous conferences at varying levels of government?

III Models of Cooperative Legislation Around the World
Various federal systems allow for different degrees of cooperative legislation. Some systems, particularly

the so-called classical federal constitutions such as the American and Canadian Constitutions' allow no
alteration in the distribution of legislative powers, unless specifically provided for in the Constitution
itself At the other end of the spectrum, Constitutions such as those in India and Australia provide for
relatively simple procedures for altering the distribution of legislative powers. A few other Constitutions
do not contemplate cooperative legislation in terms of a model involving the re-distribution of legislative

powers. For instance in Germany, the Federal government enacts a law laying down broad uniform
principles, and the provinces enact detailed laws on that basis. This section examines various federal
models and the degree to which each allows for cooperative legislation.

M Seegeneralk VENKATARAMAIAH,

saora note 12, at 85-86,

The relevant portion of Draft Article 229 read as follows:
Draft Article 229: (1) If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with

respect to which Parliament bis no power to mike laws for the States except as provided in Article 226 and 229 of this
Constitution should be regulated in such Stares by Parliament by law, and if resolunons to that effect are passed by the House
or, where there are two Houses by both the Houses of Legislatures of each of those States, it shall be lawful for Parliament
to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State
by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or where there are two Houses, by each of

the houses of Legislature of that State.
2]

See 8 CONsnTvru.NT Assacy DEnArvFs - OFrFIIAc
REPoRT 8 811 (1999 Reprint) [hereinafter CAD, VIII],
An example of cooperative legislation before the coming into force of the Constitution is the Damodar Valley Corporation
Act, 1948 passed under S. 103 (the predecessor of Article 252) of the Government of India Act, 1935. See a/so infra note 41.
These include the Elstate Duty Act, 1953 (in its application to agricultural land); Prize Competition Act, 1942; Seeds Act, 1966;
Water (Preservation and Control) Pollution Act, 1974; Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999; National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985; and the Human Organ Transplant
Act, 1994. Article 252 is also proposed to be used with respect to the politically sensitive cow slaughter law issue. See
SUmoma*TaJAN, supra note 9.
CHANDRA PAL, uora note 4, at 84-85; JACOB, nipra note 12, at 33. However, it may be pertinent to note that at least on one
occasion, Article 252 has been used to give effect to international agreements, and has been preferred over other provisions
available for the purpose, such as Article 253. The Water (Preservation and Control) Pollution Act 1974 was enacted under
the Article 252 mechanism to implement the proclamation adopted by the UN. Conference on the Human Environment at
Stockholm in 1972.
Sa SewnH N. SINaN,

CENTRE-ST4TE Rtu.TiONS

-

AjORtIRiuTANTS AND

N. So-tea-.
72
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A

No Alteration of the Balance of Legislative Powers

The United States
The debate on cooperative federalism in America started very early with the framing of the American
Constitution and continues to the present day- Much of the difficulty has resulted from different
conceptions of federalism as well as the uncertain wording of the American Constitution 2 6
The American Constitution does not expressly contemplate cooperative legislation? In contrast, the
Indian, Canadian, and Australian Constitutions expressly provide for some form of cooperative legislation
by allowing the Federal government to legislate on behalf of the States with the latter's consent? This
form of cooperative legislation is not possible in the United States. The only way in which a redstibudon
of powers can be achieved is through the process of a Constitutional amendment This is the direct
implication of the Doctrine of Limited and Enumerated Powers?
The Tenth Amendment to the American Constitution provides that what has not been reserved for the
federal legislature is within the legislative sphere of the States. Early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
on the Tenth Amendment did not tolerate any encroachment on the State's legislative power,
notwithstanding the fact that the Stare's consent may have been obtained? This trend was an affirmation
of the model of 'Dual Federalism' by the courts in the United States. Not only did the courts strictly
demarcate the areas of operation of federal and state governments, but even contemplated a kind of
conshtwroinalwi'ghtZone" separating the two spheres where neither federal nor state governments could
intrude?'
It appeared that the only mode available for cooperative legislation was as proposed in United States v
Bekins?' In that case, the US. Supreme Court recognized that the States and the Union could act

cooperatively while acting within their own spheres? DealFederakoi/eventually gave way to the model
SCRichard

Leach, InterernmentalCaoqeradon aueAmenan Fdra&rm, in EssAcs oN THE ArmA\ CONSTTnox 125-130

(Gotfrioed Diesz ed., 1964) [hereinafter Lrarn).
Tnus, A.ancAN CoNsrrroroNALLAw 8861-894 (2000). [hereinafter Txiasl. This has
progress on cooperative legislative relations which has not kept pace with cooperative governance.
Id See aho I Lkuwca

See 1 M.E JAIN,

resulted in slow

INoIAN CoSInTuroNAL LAw 6 648 (2003) [hereinafter M.P. JAlN].

In India this is served, by Article 252, in Canada by 594 of
Australian Constitution.

the Canadian Constitution and in Australia by & 51(xxxvii) of the

Tue, supra note,26, at 79,5-798; BAsu, ComsiimuAnva PsFuALise, supra note 110,at 160. The opposition to any diluton of the
states" powers flows from the famous dicta in Texav. Iibit, (1869) 7 Wal. 700 - 'The Canrtihdo, in allitsproisions,look to an

indobadM Union, compoed of indeetrictbk States" The Doctrine of Limited and Enumerated Powers which flows from tis
essentially means that the Constitution puts limitations on the powers of government, and, the activities of government are
restrieted to those areas that have been specified in the Constitution.
Arbon v. Cameron Coty Irates Improemnt Disidt (1936) 298 US. 513 (later impliedly overruled in Uifted iatev. Bekims, 58
S.CL 811 (1938)),, ligser Federal asing an Loan Arsor
tSee
Os StevwsNs &JoHN

Cka,
C.

SCHEf, AifRiUcAN CoNnUTIoNAL

(1935) 296 US. 315.

LAN 269

(2003) [hereinafter STriHa'ss & Scs]BJ.

58 S.Ci 811 (1938).
"

1b0. at 816, where it was stated that, ".-Nor did theforsaeni of an Wdnrtnctb Union of mdesirmiblM SWes make rsposdeb
cooperation Artween therNatoh and the States throc.6 the esrise of thepaverof ed to the adnnmageof thepeopk as are afies of both..
.
the States were at hberts upon obtdinuig the .constof Congres to make agreements Wh one another,xe saw no mn for doebf tat
/l69 ma
* the lie ofth Congrea f tbe essenc of tAr ctatebabd is mant/ined thakt impairment..
The influence of the Tenth Amendment in the intrpretation of constioutional issues relating to federalism has waxed and
waned over rime. For a survey of these developments and current trends, see generalyTMBu, iempra note 26, at 860 902
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of 'cooperadvejederaism'. Cooperative federalism has become an important feature of American government
from 1937 onwards and has blurred the distinction between National and State functions and.
responsibilities. 4 Cooperative federalism is a form of administrative cooperation that involves the sharing
of authority in a particular field by Federal and State agencies. Quite often, this means that State agencies
have the task of implementing federal policies and goals.3 In certain areas, State agencies may also have
the discretion of deciding whether or not to apply federal norms, which may be more stringent than the
State laws, or even to adapt federal regulations to local needs? However, it must be reiterated that this is
not cooperative legislation, but a form of cooperative administration.
The need for collective action amongst States is met through the instrument of the Interstate Compact/
Agreement. Article 1,S. 10(3) of the American Constitution allows for the same as long as Congressional
assent is given. 7 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld interstate compacts even where express
congressional sanction has not been given. For instance, in UnitedStats Steel Corporaion Muldistate Tax
Commission," the Court upheld a multi-state tax agreement for administration of taxes levied on
corporations having a ptesence in more than one State, even though no express congressional permission
had been given. Another prominent development in the evolution of a framework for cooperation
between the different tiers of government in the United States has been the creation of a Permanent
Advisory Commission on intergovernmental Relations?
Model/Mirror Legislation
A simple and effective form of cooperative legislation can be through the adoption of Model Legislation
by State legislatures or enactment of identical or 'irro? legislation by the States and the Centre. The
legislation so enacted would be legislation enacted by the States themselves and can freely be amended or
repealed. The model legislation can be framed through a cooperative and consultative process.4
Cooperative legislation of this kind would be permissible even in constitutions such as the American
Constitution where there can be no shift in legislative powers except by a constitutional amendment.

rSTEPiKNs
& ScHFisEB,
suprt note 31, at 269-270. Federal and state agencies in the United States work together on a number of
Important areas, particularly law enforcement, education, healhcare, housing and social welfare. lowever, this model of
federalism has siso bn termed as 'coercive federalism' due to the ability of the federal government to dominate the centrestate relationship with its fiscal and constitutional supremacy.
1

See Philip J. Weiser, Cooperadve Federalismandit Challenges, MicH. STATE D.CL. L. REV. 727, 729 (2003).

3

Se Philip J.Weiser, Foedlo Commn La, Cooperti RFederalismand the Enfrcenn of the TeleomAc, 76 N. Y Uiv. L. REV. 1692,
1696 (2001); Sari C. Rispmo, CooperantFederalismandConstrma Wialrof StaeSoereign immmnib, 70 Utv. C-is L. REV. 1639,
1642 (2003).
The relevant portion of Article I, S. 10(3) reads:
Articr 1,S. 10(3): No state shall without the consent of congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State
or Forcign Power,
434 US. 452 (1978).

The majority, following l'irginiav. Twnerree, 148 US. 503 (1893), held that approval was not necessary as long as the compact
did not expand State power at the expense of Federal power.
LACss apra note 25, at 134.

There is some evidence of states legislating cooperatively before Independence An example of such legislation was with
regard to the sugar industry in United Provinces and Bihar enacted in order to meet the need for concerted action to rescue
the sugar industries in the two states. SeeCAD, VIII, afqra note 20, at 811L
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As has been discussed, the problem that has been perceived with cooperative legislation in the American
context is that the Constitution does not permit any interchange or restructuring of constitutionally
delineated legislative powers. Any attempt at overreaching legislative powers, albeit for cooperative
legislative purposes, would nevertheless be unconstitutional. However, in the 'modellgislahor' framework,
legislative units are always acting within their own spheres to enact complimentary or supplementary
legislation, so there is no question of exceeding their respective powers4 This allows the introduction of
some degree of flexibility in even the most rigid of federal Constitutions such as that of the United
States. Mirror Legislation has also been experimented with in Australia43 and Canada," One problem
however, encountered in mirror legislation schemes is that the uniformity produced at the outset may be
eroded as piecemeal changes may be made over time as local legislators exercise their independent political
judgment"
In india, the Inter-State Council under Article 263," though primarily a body for coordinating planning
activities and resolving disputes, may allow for such a consultative process in the Indian context.
Unfortunately, the use of the Inter-State Council has been sparse, and this has attracted criticism from
several commentators.

42

See abroJACos, supra note 12, at 35.
See Brian R Opeskin, The Arrhzkchie-f PabkcHeal/h LawlRqorm Harmonisadon in a FederalSyriw, 22 MELB.
349 (1998) [hereinafter OPESIN]

UNv

L REv. 340,

See
orf/m note 55 arid accompanying text.
01isjiN, supra rote 43, at 349
*

Article 263 reads as under:
Artncle 263' Provisions with respect to an Tnter State Council
I f fit any time it appears to the president that the public interests would be served by the establishment of a Council charged

with the duty ofa) Inquiring into and advising upon disputes that may have arisen between States,
h) Investigating and discussing subjects in which some or all of the States, or the Union and one or more of the States, have
common interests.
c) Making recommendaions upon any such subject and in particular recommendations for she better coordination of
policy and action with respect to that subject, it shall be lawful for the President by order to establish such a council and
to define the nature of the duties to be performed by it and its organisation and procedure.
The parallel provision in the Australian Constitution is S.101 which provides for an Inter-State Commission. See also BASU,
CosirrnscmvY, supm note 1 6, at 133.

a

See 1 REPORT oi THE SAmonxiA Comaussio ON CENTasSTATE RE DONS 6 238 (1987) [hereinafter SASKARIA COMIISSION
REroiR]; V.R. Knisw.NA Isa, A COsnTuTioNALMIScELArNY 65 (1986) [hereinafter KRis-INA baa], VN. SHiu
's CoNsnm-soNa
or INDI 687 (Mahendra P. Singh ed., 2001), Under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 five zonal councils were set up. The
members of the councils include the Union Home Minister and the Chief Ministers of the States. However, these councils
have been "nonfrn/iwdal en/er
adafor lark of iniiahre,absence of aproper eretaiai,sbyness to dircess
tromarsial and sensfder'issues,
and wne par4 nil a/ te Ceitr andwest of the State." Seealso LM- Singhvi, Cooperads Fedmekrrw. A Cner Enebbmrent of Inlter
Slate ComIsel in FEDERAL Sasts, CENTRE STATE RELATIONS AND STATE AUTOorn
660 (Verinder Grover ed., 1997). Ser also
HA. GANi, CENTREs-STATE RELATnONS & SARKARIA COMMISSION: ISSUES, INSTiTUTIONS & CHALLENGES 99-109 (1990).
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B

Limited Cooperative Legislation with Respect to Specified Subjects

Canada
The Constitution of Canada expressly provides for cooperative legislation, but only through a very
limited authority of delegation of legislative powers from the Provincial Parliament to the Dominion
Parliament.' Only certain specified subjects in the Provinces' legislative sphere can bi handed over to'
the Dominion Parliament. The question of any wider delegation of provincial legislative matters to the
Dominion Parliament was answered in the negative by the Canadian Supreme Court in the seminal case
of Attorney Generalof Nova Scoha v.Attorng Genera of Canada." This was a reference on a Bill that allowed
the Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia to delegate to, and withdraw from the Dominion Legislature,
the power to enact laws on employment in any industry, or any work or undertaking with respect to the
same. A law so made by the Dominion Legislature would have the same effect as if the Provincial
Legislature enacted it. The principal reason for the Court not allowing the delegation was that in the
scheme of Canadian Federal-State relations, the Constitution does not contemplate any disturbance of
legislative relations beyond what is permitted expressly.' Moreover, the Court also held that delegation
takes place from superiors to subordinates. This cannot be the case with Dominion and Provincial
legislatures, since they are equal and independent in their own spheres.'
The position in Canada embodies the principle that any disturbance of federal powers must derive its
validity from an express provision in the Constitution. This was summed up by Rinfret, CJ. in the Nova
Scotia case "...The ConstiAion of Canada does not belong to eitherto the Parkamentorto the Legirlatres,it
belongs to the country and it is there that the anZens uillfindprotecton of rights to which they are
entitled...The county is entitled to insist that legilafkon adoptedunder S. 91 should be passed
exclasnie by Pariament as much as thepeopk of eachprotnce ar entitled to insist that hgislation
concerningmatters in the enumeratedin S. 92 should come exckusiveyfrom their legislatures... "'
Though the decision in the Nova Scoda case struck down delegation of legislative powers between the
Dominion and the Provinces, the need for cooperation amongst Provinces and between two Provinces
and the Centre remained. Consequently, the decision in the Nova Scota case has been qualified by several
subsequent decisions. One of the important qualifications to the bar against inter-delegation is that it
extends only to legislative inter-delegation. Administrative inter-delegation, for instance the delegation to
Provincial agencies of the power to regulate matters exclusively within the legislative competence of the

S. 94 of the British North America Act, 1867 enables every Province except Quebec to hand over its jurisdiction over
propery and civil rights only to the Dominion inperpeto.As will is discussed subsequently, in India and Australia there are no
similar restrictions on what subject matters within the legislative competence of the States can be transferred.
[1950] 4 D.L.R. 369. [hereinafter Nova Scoha Case]. For arguments in favour of delegation in Canada se FR. Scott, Case and
Comoet, 26 CAN. Bion REv. 984 (1948).
Ibid at 371,
lbid at 384.
[1950] 4 D.LfR. 369, 371-372.
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Federal Parliament and vice versa, has been held to be perrmissible.Y Mirror Legislation and Legislation
which refers to the laws of other legislatures (Provincial or Central)have also been upheld as constitutional
and not violative of the bar against legislative inter delegation of powers."
Germany
The German Basic Law does not contemplate cooperative legislation in the true sense of the term.
However, Article 75 of the Basic Law specifies subjects fit for "framework legislation" by the federation.
The federation is given the power to enact "general provisions of law" with respect to certain specified
subjecrs' within the Land's" sphere in the interest of uniform public policy. However, the Land retains
the authority to make specific laws with respect to these subjects? Therefore, there are constitutionally
recognized parts of the Land's legislative sphere over which the Federation may exercise legislative
competence. However, the extent of encroachment is limited to the enactment of general principles, and
specific details are left to the Linder, thus balancing the need for uniformity and flexibility and the need
for independence of the Land. Moreover, the problem of the Land legislation being unable to regulate
the matter can also be dealt with under Article 74 of the Basic Law, which empowers the Federation to
enact a law in the matter in such a situation.'5

C

Constitutions with only Limited Restrictions on Cooperative Legislation

Australia
Unlike the Constitutions examined earlier, the Australian Constitution expressly provides for a voluntary
change in the balance of powers between the States and the Commonwealth. S. 51(xxxvii)" provides
that if one or more States so desire, they may make a reference of a matterwithin its legislative competence
to the Commonwealth to pass appropriate legislation applicable to the States making the reference. The
procedure for the passage of an Act requires two steps.' First,the passing of the referring Act by the

See

Briids Cohmbia (Milk Bard9 v. Grirnib, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 895, R v. Fnrrinf, 11991] 3 SCTR 89. CaXbkn v. Oario Higas
Tranpor Board, (1968) ELLA. 2d. 384; RE. Petm MateA ig Board v. H..
ifi&&AG. Canada, [19521 2 SC.R. 392; DFS
IVetres lc. .Matoba (Liqor Coanl Conrisdsio), [2002 1 W1WR. 370. See alo BoA LAsxx, CANennN CONsMUrmoNAL

Lw 35-57 (1960).

mirror legislanon for a unified
administrative and fiscal regine for offshore petroleum resources against a challenge of inter-delegation) and AftermyGentral,
Ontaio r Sol, 11956 S.CR, 137 (upholding incorporation by reference in a law in relation to reciprocal enforcement of
maintenance orders). Stake David WS. Yudin, Te FvenraSpn&d g Poweri Canada,AmioardthemnindStatu, 13 NATJ. OF
CONsr. L. 437 (2000-2001).
See Seameda Manie Servies Dd. v. Canada, (2003) N S.R. (;d) 19 (upholding the validity of

* These include regional planning, land distribution, water managenent, legal status of the press and film industry, and higher
education
* The 'Land'(pl: Linder) is the German equivalent of State/Province
'
See SABINE MIca.iOwsVJ & LoRNA Woons, GsAuNW CONSTrrunoNA. LAw 33 (1999)
l SeegemdJoachim Jens Hess; Germany: CaopdAvw Fednds;tojoinPocyMakia in FEDERAUSM AND DECErNTRAUsrON
Id.
CENTRE STATE RELATIONS IN INDIA AND GERMANY 144 (Gert Kueck ct al. eds., 1998).
'

The relevant portion of S. 51 of the Australian Constitution reads as under:

S 51 - The Parliament shall..have power to make laws .. with respect to planirum (xxxvii): Matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Pathament or Parliaments of any State or
States, but so that the laws shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments the marseris referred, or which afterwards adopts
the law
See

RH. LAn,

LANE'S COMNENTaARY ON THE AUSTRALtAN ComsmnnoN 252-253 (1986)

(hereinafter LANa].
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State legislature (the -'reference'"' and second the passing of a Commonwealth Act on the matter so
referred.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the interpretation of S. 51(xxxvii) is the distinction between
'referral' and 'transfer'. Australian States do not lose the power to legislate over the subject matter as a
result of the reference. In other words, after the referral, the legislative power becomes concurrent
between the State and the Commronwealth.6 This principle has been reiterated as recently as 20026 In
the hypotheticalAustraian Constitution, if subjects C and D of EntryY are referred, both State and the
Commonwealth Parliament will have concurrent jurisdiction on subjects C and D. If the Commonwealth
passes a law only with respect to D, the State still remains free to legislate on C. As has been discussed
subsequently, this position has the advantage of avoiding the possibility of legislative gridlock. However,
this is sublect to S. 109 of the Australian Constitution, which states that in case of a conflict between
State and Commonwealth enactments, the State enactments are held to be in abeyance to the extent of
repugnancy. 4 A State may also adopt legislation in pursuance of S. 51(xxxvii), and most authorities
indicate that such a law would have force in the State as if it were a law passed by the Commonwealth?"
Broadly, three important issues have arisen with respect to the interpretation of S. 51(xxxvii) of the
Australian Constitution. The first issue concerns the extent of the reference that can be made, that is to
say, whether the entire subject matter of an entry can be referred and whether the reference needs to
specify the exact nature of the Commonwealth Act.* The second issue that arises is whether States can
attach conditions while making a reference to the Commonwealth. The third issue is whether a reference
once made can be revoked.
With respect to the extent and nature of reference, the High Court of Australia has ruled that a reference
may be in general terms, i.e.

the

State Act need not lay out the phraseology and content of the

Commonwealth Act." However, doubts have been raised as to whether there can be a 'mass' reference
or abdication by the States of their legislative powers in favour of the Commonwealkh." In other words,
the luestion remains whether S. 51(xxxvii) can be used to convert Australia into a unitary state. On the
second issue of whether conditions can be attached to the reference, it has been held that the reference

*

This situation may be contrasted with the situation in India where only a resolution of the I-ouses of Legislature is required.
This resolution in India is a mere 'act of legislature' and not a 'legislativeact' and therefore does not require the assent of the
Governor. see
Union of India v. 1CR Chsndqji A.R. 1979 S.C. 1415, 1422 (para 16).

6

U

Graam v PaNrrn, (1950) 81 CL.R. 1,
Se Commnowealth Director of PuA; Pwairmsws v. Fukuato, [2002) QCA 20; Commonawkh Direcor of Pubic Prsoteaoar

"

JOHNsON, sJora note 1, at 69.

Codbe, [2002] Q.C-A. 340.
JOHNSON, snpranote 1, at 62. The contrary view has been taken by LockhartJ., in Sandea. Rgrtswr, Srprem Court (Quansln)n4,
(1996) .Cit 123.131-132. However, these viers have been disapproved in Boan)f Ex=srs r La-wM, (2000) FCR. 255,
264.
6.

1

65. See a/so Ross Anderson, Rgekreca of Powers by tbe States to the Commonwealth, 2 UNiv. WA. A,4N. L.
REv. 1 (1951) |hereimafter ANDEaso].
RAv PAtb Vehides Liamin Tbmsa/. er.p. Aonst;aate Nadc rAbnlha
, (1964) 113 C.L.R. 207;Ainies of Nte South 1141w Ph
L.d vStatof NewSoerstlfkIs, (1964) it1 C.LR. 1. In both these cases the issue involved was the geners] reference of the
'matter of air transport' to the Commonwealth by the Tasmanian legislature.

JOHNSON, Spra note 1, at

JoHtioK, flpam note 1, at 65s
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can indeed impose such restrictions." Indeed, the duration for which the reference is to be made can
also be specified. The Commonwealth Act would be subject to those restrictions. The clear inference
from this is that the Commonweath's power to legislate under S. 51(xxxvii) derives its validity from the
reference." It is pertinent to note that in India, States cannot impose any such restriction in the resolutions
passed under Article 252(1).'
There have been no juAdicial pronouncements on the third issue of revocabliry of a reference, but three

different views have been expressed in this regard

2

(i)

the reference is irrevocable,

(ii)
(iii)

the reference is revocable till the commonwealth passes the law,
the reference is revocable at any time.

The balance of authorities seems to favour the last view" if revocation is indeed possible, then yet
another question arises - that of the validity of the Commonwealth Act after revocation- The
Commonwealth's power to legislate is derived from the reference (the State law). Once the reference is

revoked, the Commonwealth no longer has the legislative competence to legislate on that subject. Since
the reference is the basis for the validity of the commonwealth law, the Commonwealth law ceases to be
valid after the revocation of the reference? Using the hypothetical Australian Constitution, this situation
can be expressed in the following terms. Matters C and Din Entry Y are referred to the Commonwealth,
and some time after the Commonwealth passes alaw the reference is revoked. The consequences of this
arc that the Commonwealth law with respect to C and D is invalid and the Commonwealth can no longer
legislate on C and D.
The present interpretation of S. 51(xxxvi) reflects a desire to prevent any furdier erosion of the powers
of the States in so far as revocation and conditional references are possible. Therefore, what is contemplated
is only a temporary extension of legislative powers to the Commonwealth, rather than their permanent
transfer.
However, the Australian experience has been that S. 51(xxxvii) has been rarely invoked in the past."
Several reasons have been cited for this. The most prominent reason is that States have a tendency to
resist any inroads into their powers by an already dominant Commonwealth." Similar fears were also
"Id
"

JoaNsxrpra

note 1, at 71.

So Union of Indiri. VB, Chwdary, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1415,1425 (para 31). SnARvNol . DATAR,

DAra ON CoNsrmnoN

or

900 (2001) [hereinaeer DATra], Interestingly enough, the language of both Article 252 and S 51(xxxvii) is silent on the
point of imposition of restrictions by the Stace on the Centret power to legislate Wheress in Australia courts have allowed
the imposidon of restrictions, this has notr been the case in India.
INDiA

'

JONSoN, stpra note 1, at 69.
JOHNSON, rnpra note 1, at 71-72.

Id. However, certain vinews expressed in Sande Rvisra, (1996) EC.R. 123, run contrary to this position. It has been held in
that case that once the Commonwealth Parbarnent enacts a law on a particular matter the source of legislative power is with
the CommonweLakh and not with the State (at 132)- However, these views are hard to reconcile with the position taken in the
same decision that the reference is of the matter and not of the power (at 131).
"

FJNsoN,,

rM n ore 1, at 46.

Id. This cornment is indicative of the unique and somewhat conrroversi position held by provisions such as 5. M(sx-avii) in
federal consototios. A view has also been expressed that the financial dominance of the Commonwealth would actually
resut in an inceased use of the provision (through coercion on the part of the Commonwealth) so as to further enlarge
federal powers- fe AmarnssoN, supa note 52, at 3
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expressed during the framing of India's Constitution." The aforementioned doubts, particularly those
relating to the States' ability to regain the power to legislate over referred matters (revocability of reference)
have also resulted in hesitation to use S. 51(xxxvii) . This legal uncertainty has led to recommendations for
amendments to the Australian Constitution to clarify the legal doubts discussed previously.78 However,
of late, several important laws including the Corporations Law for Australia, have been passed using S.
51 (xxxvri) of the Consuitin. Alternative models such as enactment of identical and complimentary
legislation (mirror legislations) by the States have also been used and important areas such as offshore
petroleum resources have been regulated in this manner."
On the whole, it is submitted that S. 51 (xxxvii) provides for perhaps the greatest degree of flexibility as
far as the balance of legislative powers is concerned in any present-day Constitution. It allows not only
for the States to authorize the Commonwealth to enact laws, but also provides for some degree of
control over the application of the laws, as well as the ability of States to withdraw from the Commonwealth
the competence to enact those laws.
The Government of India Act, 1935
The present provision with respect to cooperative legislation in the Indian Constitution, Article 252, can
be traced back to the Government of India Act, 1935. S. 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935'"
provided for a great degree of flexibility to the federal structure envisaged under that Act."' Not only did
it allow for two or more States to authorize the Federal legislature to pass laws on State subjects for them
but it also provided for individual States to 'fine tune' the law so passed subsequendy through amendment,
or even repeal the law if required. In the hypothetical Government of India Act, 1935, if matters C and
D of Entry Y are 'referred', and a law is passed accordingly by the Federal Parliament, the States may
subsequently amend or repeal such a law freely The implication of this is that even though the requirement
of uniformity and joint action is recognized, this remains ultimately subordinate to the need to protect
the legislative sovereignty of the State in its own sphere. There is no doubt that there is a shift of
legislative competence over the relevant subject matter from the province to the Federal legislature, but

See

%newsexpressed bv -lon'ble Mr K Sanbanm in the debate on Draft Article 229 (prenirgwr

to Article 252),

CAD, VIII,

spra noe 18, at 812.
"

See Cheryl Saunders, Imrarchaw of Poes Proposal. 52 Ausr.LJ 187 (1978) [hereinalter SaLoRas]. The author discusses draft
proposts for sntroducing S 108B The proposed provision would expressly provide that a reference under S 51(xxvii) could
: -(i) be an made sn as to take effect or cease to have effect at a particular time, or on the fulftliment of conditions (ii)be
revncable (iii) be extended by a particular duration (iv) not prevent any exercise of power by the legislature making the
re ferene Also proposed is S. 108A which is a provision corresponding to
references to Stares.

allowing the Commonwealth to make

Li4daie Schnu, 24 MEELB.
UiNTV.L REv. 478 (2000).

"

See Graeme Hill, R v. Hughes and the Fature of Co-Operadef

"

S. 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935 reads as under:
"

5. 51 (xxvii)

1:03- Power of Federal Legislature to legislate for 2 or more Provinces by consent -

If it appears to der Legislatures of 2 or more provinces to be desirable that any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial
legislatiure Ust should be regulated in those provinces by an Act of the Federal Legislature, and if resolutions to thateffect are
passed by all the chambers of chose Provincial Legislatures, it shall be lawful for the Federal legislature to pass an Act
regulating the matler accordingly, but any Act so passed may, as respects any Province to which it applies, he aendator
re
leedby an sot -f the Ie saaure of that Province" (emphasis supplied).
"

For a discussion of the legislative history and background of the 1935 Act, see grnersil A. Si-uiAM, PRELUrDE TO INIlAN
FnsmeAUSI. A Srn op DiviStoi OF Powass Usna Acts Or 1919 AND 1935 215-262 (1976).
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the effect of this is greatly mitigated by the retention of the power to amend or repeal with the State
legislature. In that sense, there is no irreversible transfer of powers under S. 103 of the Government of
India Act, 1935.
The Constitution of India
The provision for cooperative legislation in India is found in Article 252 of the Constitution. Clause (1)
of Article 252 permits two or more State legislatures to pass a resolution requesting the Parliament to
legislate on specified subject matters, which were originally in the State list. In pursuance of this resolution,
Parliament passes a law that is applicable to the States that have passed the resolution. Other States may
also make this law applicable to them by passing a resolution adopting this Central legislation, which
becomes prospectively applicable from the date such resolution is adopted." Subsequent to the Central
Act becoming applicable, there remains no difference between an originally resolving State and an adopting
State,"
Article 252(2) relates to the procedure for repeal and amendment of a law passed in pursuance of a
resolution under Article 252(1).' Amendment or repeal of the Central Act occurs in the same manner as
the enactment of the Central Act, i.e. in pursuance of resolutions passed by two or more States to which
the Central Act applies, requesting Parliament to amend or repeal the Act. Once resolutions are passed,
the Parliament enacts an amending or repealing Act. This subsequent amending or repealing Act is
applicable only to those States that passed the resolution in the first instance or later adopted it by
resolution. The amending or repealing Act does not apply ipso facto to all States to which the original
Central Act applied. Therefore, unlike the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution expressly
provides for a redisribution of powers if two or more States feel the necessity for the same and resolve
accordingly. Also, unlike the Canadian Constitution, there are no limitations in Article 252 itself on what
subjects can be transferred' to the Centre. It has been apprehended that India could be transformed into
a unitary state if a State legislature 'transfers' all of its legislative subjects to the Centre through the
Article 252 mechanism, This would be particularly likely if the political party at the Centre is also in
power in the States," The only defense to this would be for the courts to step in and term it unconstitutional
being an affront to federalism which is a part of the 'basic structure' of the Indian Constitution?

2

See

Venkataraman v Control/et of Estate Duty, A.I.R. 1960 Mad. 305, 306 (para 9-10) (D.B.); S.C treemanavikrananRafa,
A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 522, 534 (para 50) (D.B.).

Zamonn Raiah of Kothikode v. ControLerof Es/ate Dae
"

See SUnHAsFI C. JAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: SELECT IssuEs AND PERCEPTONS 131 (2000) |hereinafter JAEN, SahucT
IS5DES].

As an aside, it may be mentioned that in the Supreme Court's serninsl decision in KeravenandaBhamli v. State of Ker/a, (1973)
4 SC.C. 225, 632 (pars 1149-A), Article 252 has been used as example to suggest that the Constitution itself drws q
distinction between "amendmeat" and "repea of a statute since in the very same provision the two ec used in contradisnetion
to each other.
See Stateof W1yest
Bengalv. PronabKwMar SUr, (2003) 9 S.C.C. 490: 2003(2) C.T.C. 182 (S.C.);M

A.Jltan Moibinddin i Goiwrven

of Andrua Pradesh, AIR. 2002 A.P 105,
See S.C. DAsH, THE CONSTTUTON Or NDWA
A CoMPARArva Sruov 139 (1960); HARI HAn DAs & SANJUKTA MOFAPATR,
CENTRB-STATE RELATiONS IN INDIA: A STwY OF SUeaNATiONAL ASPIRATIONS 96 (1986).
"

'Federalism' has been held to be a part of the 'Basic Structure' of the Constitution in S.R. Bonnaiv. Union of india, ALI.R
1994 SC. 1918, 1981 (para S0), per PB SewantJ
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A comparison of this position with the one under the Australian Constitution as well as the position
prevailing under the Government of India Act, 1935 also gives interesting insights. Whereas in the
Australian Constitution, the reference to the Commonwealth has its legal basis in a State Act, under
Article 252 of the Indian Constitution the powers are transferred pursuant to a resolution by the State
legislatures. Moreover, unlike their Australian counterparts, Indian States exercise very little control over
the subject matter after it has been transferred. It is also unclear as to why Article 252(2) did not follow
S. 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935 in not allowing individual States to make amendments to
Acts passed by the Centre (in pursuance of resolutions passed by the State legislatures). Commentators
such as H.M. Seervai have also voiced this doubt." The reason for this may perhaps be found in the
tendency of the framers of the Indian Constitution lo lean towards centralisation and the dilution of the
federal principle."'
The working of cooperative legislative schemes in vnrious federal constitutions outlined above would be
instructive in gaining a better understanding of the neaning-interpretation and workings of cooperative
Legislation in India, which is examined in detail below.

IV The Conflict and the Interplay between Parliament and the State Legislature

in India
This section deals with the one of the most contentious and unresolved aspects of Article 252-the
respective legislative power of Parliament and the State Legislature after a resolution is passed under
Article 252(1) by a State Legislature(s). There have been primarily three areas of conflict:
i)

where there is a pre existing State law on a subject matter,which is also covered by a subsequent
resolution of the State Legislature;

ii)

where the State attempts to amend or repeal the pre-existing State law subsequent to the
resolution; and

iii) where the State enacts a law on the same subject matter covered by its previous resolution.
These three situations cover the primary dilemma with which this paper began: bow does one reconcile
the need for an effective common legislation without depriving the States of their primary power in a
federation, namely, the power of legislation in their own sphere? In order to resolve these conflicts,
courts have had to develop interpretative principles ihat draw upon their conceptions of federalism. For
instance, under the Surrender/Ab&adonApproachof itikerpretation, the underlying thinking of cooperative
legislation and federalism in general is that the Ce-ntre should have primary legislative authority and
should take the lead when a common law is felt necessary. Therefore, the States are presumed to have
'surrendered' and thereby lost all legislative competence with respect to those subject matters- On the
other hand, the ConcurrentFieldApproachseeks to achieve a balance with respect to legislative powers of
the Centre and States when a common legislation is sought. The spirit of 'cooperation' between the
Centre and the States is given greater emphasis here.

2 RroRT or THE SaRiARIA CosMEssioN ON CENTR-SJE RELATIONS (QDESHONNAlE)
COSISSION QUESTIONNAIKE.
See Suin N. Siaon

epma note

24, at 74

8

40 (1987) [hereinafter SAMARIA

4. see ake BRLARATi-iRAY, Evowmo. o Fawuass
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ht may be pertinent to make a methodological clarification at this stage. In the following sections most of
the cases discussed have more than one understanding of the operation of Article 252. Therefore, it
may be noted that a case may be an authority for more than one interpretaive approach.
A

Distinction Approach/Harmonious Construction: The Rule of Avoidance of
Conflict

This approach by the courts postulates that the Central and State legslations are actually not in conflict
because both the Centre and the States have legislative competence on that subject matter- Consequently,
the courts have attempted to: (a) bring the State and Central Acts within two separate legislative Entries
or (b) construe the scope of the conflicting provisions such that the State and Central Acts cover different

subject matters within the same legislative entry.
The first variant of this approach was adopted in R.M.D.C. (lysore) Pt. Ltd. v State of Myore." The
argument put in terms of the hypothetical Indian Constitution was that the Central and State Act were
both in respect of the same Entry Y, which was a part of the State resolution under Article 252. However,
it was held that the State legislation was in respect of a subject matter in an entry not covered by the
resolution of the State Legislature, while the Central legislation was in respect of an entry covered by the
State resolution. 1 In terms of the hypothetical Constitution, the Central Act was passed in pursuance of
Entry Y, which was covered by the State resolution while the State Act was covered by Entry X, which
was not included within the resolution. Therefore, the court held that there was no conflict between the
Central and State Acts.'
In the second variation of this approach, the courts hold that only a portion of the subject marer
contained within a legislative entry is transferred by the resolution of the State Legislature under Article
252 (1), and not the entwa subject matter contained within every legislative entry Here, the Court
narrows the scope of the resolution" and holds that the subject matter covered by the Acts are 'distinct
and independent subjects^" lying within the same entry In terms of the hypothetical Indian Constitution,
the State resolution refers only to subject matters C and D (lying within Entry Y), while subject matters
A and B (also lying within Entry Y) continue to remain within the exclusive legislative competence of the

ALR. 1962 S.C 594.
N at 600. The Court ruled that the Entry 34, List II, "betting and gambling" was distinct from Entry 62, List 11,"taxes
on ..beting and gambling" The resolution of the State Legislature under Article 252(1) was, in respect of Entry 34 and not
in respect of Entry 62. Therefore, it was held the State still had the right to tax activitiesrelated to beuting and gambling.

However, this conflict avoidance method
.Snm note 90 at 161001.

was adopted to resolve only a part of the issues raised before
the court. In respect of other contenuons, the Court had to hold that there was a conflict berween the Central Act and the
State Act The State Act was in respect of subject matters, which after the resolunon of the State Legislature was within the
competence of the Centre only. Therefore, where the State Act was in confliec with the Central Act, the former was held to
be void.
Ksisha Bierao Destpan&v LandiTdbul Dhanmad (1993) 1 SC.C 287, 300, per Jaycharidra Reddy, J.
This is iustilied, by the particular phraseology in Article 252. The meaning of the expression "m-es rnara/d"oecurnngin
Article 252(1) is narrower than the meaning of the word 'hairer"menioned in the Lin to the Vllrith Scheduln S JA%.
-80ChokaiDbry, A. .R. 1979 8,C 1415. 1425 (para
aFr'ss note 83, aE 132. But see for nbira view, Union ofladia v
SaracT IsS.
31), where the Court held that [ha
.It wotld
ioo...conbray
the nes of Arark 252(7) 19 read the resouaonpassed4_Me Stair
.
Lilature dwjeaist/aay rartdo, th redulion- is not a4pl silh eidns.n
SKdishna Bhie

Defbyank v L ad Tribat Dhard, (1993) 1 SCC 287, 300
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State Legislature. This is because the entries in the Legislative Lists are only legislative heads or fields of
legislation, and they should be held to have a wide scopet 6 This gives the court leeway to bring the
different Acts within different subject matters lying within the same entry. For instance, the State Act is
said to be only in respect of subject matters A and B and not in respect of subject matters C and D,
which are covered by the Central Act. Therefore, the courts attempt to avoid either a lacuna in the law"
or having to deal with a situation of actual conflict between a State and Central law in relation to Article
252."
The DistintionApproach is the most widely used approach to resolve conflicts between State and Central
laws relating to Article 252. In fact, even where courts have to deal with a situation where a conflict
between the State and Central law cannot be avoided, they attempt to resolve a part of the problem using
the DistinctonApproach." However, there are situations where a conflict between a State and Central Act
cannot be avoided because they relate to the same subject matter within the same legislative entry. Expressed
in terms of the hypothetical Indian Constitution, both the State and Central Act relate to subject matter
C in Entry Y of the State List. In such a situation, the DitincionApproach will have to give way to the
Surrender/AbdicationApproach, the State Subect Approaeh, or the ConcurrentFieldApproach
B

The Surrender/Abdication Approach

If the DistrnuconApproach is inapplicable, the courts have more often than not favoured the Surrender/
Abdication Approach. The SurrenderApproach has the support of the majority of judicial decisions." It
also appears to have been anticipated by some members of the Constituent Assembly"'i
In dealing with a situation of clear conflict between a State and Central Act, most courts have taken the
unambiguous view that a resolution by the State Legislature operates as an "abdication or surrender""
of the subjects covered by that resolution to the Centre. The State would no longer have the legislative
competence on that subject matter. In the hypothetical Indian Constitution, it would be as if matters C
and D "had been lifted out of List II and placed in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution"."

See Cakutia Gas Company (Proinetary)lid v. Sate of 15%;/Bengal A.LR. 1964 S.C 1044
H.H. Shantided Gaikwadv. Sasjbhai HaribbdPaie A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 1462, 1472-1473.
"F In fact where the issue of repugnancy under Article 254 has been raised the courts have tried to decide the case just using the
DisinclionApproach and avoid deciding on the former issue, iee PR.D. C (Mywr) Pat Lid v State of Mywre, A.R. 1962 S.C.
594, 600.
* Ser, for example, RM.DC (Myore) Pa. Lid. v. State of Mysore, AIR. 1962 S.C 594 and Krishna Bbviras Deshpands v Land
TDibunal Dhanvad, (1993) 1 S.CC. 287 where in both cases a part of the conflict was resolved by bringing parts of the
impugned Acts unde either two legislative entries or within two different subjects lying within the same legislative entry.
Where the conflict could not be avoided in these cases the court held that the State Act was 'void' to the extent of the
conflict.
I
See, fir example, Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande v. Land Tribuna( Dbarawd,(1993) 1 S.C.C. 287; I/Vay Kimrsr Shsarma v. Soe of
Karwalaka, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2072; Tbmalm Venkab v Slate of Andbra Praderb,A.LR 1980 S.C. 1568; Union of India v. VB.
Cbondarv,AI R 1979 S.C. 1415; Reendra Kumar v. Stae of Afadly Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 M.P. 108, T Khade Itma & Sons a
3/ate of Karnataka, A ].R. 1979 Kar. 71, 76-78 (par 14). This approach, unmindful of the consequences, is also favoured by
noted writers. SeeJAI, SmELcr Issus, spranote 68, at 131-134.
15
The views expressed by the Hon'ble K. Santhanam in the debate on Draft Article 229 (precursor to Ardicle 252), CAD, VII,
'

,

mpra note 18, at 812.
HE Union of India. 1B. Choazvdar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C 1415, 1424 (para 26), Pn-droaKemarxr Stateof Madby Pradesh,A.R.
1979 M. 108, 112 (para 8), per G.? Singh, fJ.
* See Thamaft Vaekdnhv SAteof Andrcradesb, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1568, 1570 (para 2).
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Consequendy, the State would no longer be able to legislate with respect to C and D and only Parliament
would be able to do so." Moreover, after the resolution, the State cannot amend or repeal the preexisting State Act as it had lost all legislative competence with respect to that subject matter.'" However,
a pre-existing State law on C and D would not become void because at the time of enacting such legislation
the State Legislature retained legislative competence over that subject matter." Only when Parliament
legislates does that part of the State Act that is in conflict with the Central Act become void." A
hypothetical conflict will not render the pre-existing State Act void. There must be a real conflict with a
subsequent Central Act so that the two Acts cannot operate simultaneously. Only in such a situation is
the State Act rendered void to the extent of the conflict
The Surrendrr/Abdicaho Approach has some very serious consequences, which do not appear to have
been foreseen by the courts. As stated earlier, the resolution of the State Legislature virtually transfers
subjects C and D to the Union List, i.e. Parliament has the exclusive power to legislate on the subjects. As
will be discussed at length subsequently, the Centre is not copelkd to legislate on a matter so 'abdicated'
in its favour by operation of Article 252,o' and no motives can be attached to the action of the Legislature
The State Legislature would, of course, be devoid of any
it discharge of its legislative functions.'
legislative powers with respect to the subject matters C and D after the resolution of the State Legislature.
Yet the Centre would not be able to amend or repeal the Central Statute without resolutions From at least
two of the States concerned.' " These positions, taken together, have the potential of creating a legislative
gridlock between the Centre and the States, especially on politically sensitive subjects. One example of a
politically sensitive subject would be the recent debate on the enactment of a statewide common cowslaughter ban law which is proposed to be enacted through the device of Article 252.'

Due to ideological

or other differences, the government at the Centre may not wish to legislate on such 'surrendered'

However, the situation, i

not identical to Parliament lgislative power under Art cle 246 in respect of the Union List for two
reasons: (i) An Act passed by Parliament under Article 252(1) would apply to States that have passed a resolution under
Article 252(l) requesting a Central legislationor would applyro States that subsequently adopt the Act so passed by Parliament
by means of a resolution under Article 252(1), and (ii)In case of repeal or amendment of the Central Act, Padiament would
have to follow the procedure in Article 252(2) i.e. there would have be a resolution by two or more States requesting Parliament
to amend or repeal the Central Act.

a

The State would notr
even be allowed to pass any subordinate legislation under the pre-existing State Act for the reason that
executive powers are co-extensive with legislarive poweL See ParsbollamDor Tandn v. Sotamf UnarPaednh A.l.R. 1987 All.

56, 65 (pare7) (D.).
]Id
.See R

D. C

pMoye)P
lid v. Sam of Mysor, A.I.R. 1962 SC 594, 600-601 (pars 16).

.fresrdoa Itlei.*DOES
252?
.rgeneral4
e

PARuAirrNT HAFv
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LIEGIsLATE IN RESPECT OP A RmSOLUTION PAssED

BYTHE STATE UNDER ARsTicLE

K Nanj v. Sio of Andloa Praderb, (1985) 1 SCC. 523

* Anicle 252(). See Base, ComaserARY, apra note 16, at 133. whose opinion on the mater was subsequently upheld by rise
SpeaLer of the Lok Sabba. Correcly interpreting Armele 252(2), the Speaker of the LokSabba on April 26,1958 held, in the
context of dhe Estate Duty (Amendment) Bill, that a fresh consent of the States (through resolutions of the Stare legisulrre)
would be necessary for omenchng/repeaing the Act In other words, merely because Padiament has enacted the Act dos not
autormaoally give it the power to repeal or amend ir Se ae CiassiA Pam, supra note 4, at 84-85.
"..

SUNDERARAJAN

ffraTInote 9

85

Student Bar Review

Vol 16

20 04

subjects and at the same time, the States would also not be able to legislate on these subjects as these have
been 'surrendered' to the Union List." Further, as has been elaborated subsequently, there can be no
remedy in a court of law for a situation like this. It is submitted that this situation would be akin to
creating a legal void on these matters.
C

The State List Approach

This approach postulates that the subject matter covered by the resolution is nor 'abdicated or surrendered'
to the Union List. The law passed by the Parliament in pursuance of a resolution by the State Legislature
would onl have the status of a 'later State law"'n Credence is added to the State List Approach since
Article 252(2) provides that the Act passed under Article 252(1) can be amended or repealed by Parliament
ont if the State legislatures pass a resolution requiring its amendment or repeal. A pnmafae view would
indicate that the general principles of statutory interpretation in respect of prior and later laws passed by
the same Legislature would apply. The consequent interpretative result being that.a prior State law, where
in conflict with a later State law would be, to that extent iipliedly repealed."
This approach, it is submitted, while extremely novel, only partially clears the 'confusion. It avoids the
legislative gridlock of the SurrenderApproach, because, in theory at least the State retains, at all times,
legislative competence with respect to matters C and D. If the 'later State Act' (that is the Central. Act) is
repealed or amended; the State Legislature would regain the right to legislate with respect to those matters
previously occupied by the Central Act.
However, despite its merits, the State istApproach suffers from certain serious conceptual and practical
limitations. Conceptually, this approach creates a classification with too many unknowns and fictions. For
instance, it is not clear whether all the general principles of statutory interpretation would automatically

apply in case of a 'deemed later State law.' Secondb, the logical conclusion of stating that a subject matter
remained on the State List would be that the State retains legislative competence over it and could freely
amend or repeal the statute. However, in view of Article 252(2) this is clearly not the case, as only the
Parliament has the competence to amend or repeal the Central Act. Therefore, there is little sense in
stating that the Central Act was actually a 'liter State Act' because the State in reality has no legislativ e
competence to amend or repeal it and has no legislative doninion over it." Therefore, one limb of this

Id The possibility for gridlock is not merely hypothetical but quite real. Recently Article 252 was conceived as a method of
creating a national legislation on Cow Slaughter, which is currently within the legislative competence of the States in Entry
15, List II, VI" Schedule. It is not implausible to assume a situation where the resolution passed by the States in relation to
the cow-slaughter law, was done at a time when the Centml go'ernment was ideologically amemble t such legislation. Postresolution, the Central Government may have changed and the new Government may be ideologically opposed to such

legislation. In such a situation, the State would be powerless to enact legislation on Cow-Slaughter and the Centre would not
be willing to do so.
'

See Tumafi RaWgyya v S/ale
SaeG.P Sus,

of

Andbma Preidrsb, A.R. 1978 AP 106, 114 (para 22) (EB.) [hereinafter Rngow].

PRINtiIPLbs or STTrToC

1NTEtITETATION 522-536 (2001). Also, this point was specifically made in Ragygya,

mpr note 113, at 114 (para 22).
1

But of course Parliament can repeal or amend the Act only after the States pass a resolution under Anicle 252(2) requesting
the same- Nevertheless, this does not take away from the fact that it is the Parliament which considers the Bill, debaes it,
modifies it and ultimately passes it. In fact, as wilt be explained subsequently, the Centre is not even required to consult the
State on the exact format and phraseology of the amending Act and can even 'ignore' a resolution of the States calling for
the asmendment or repeal of the Act. Therefore, there is no doubt that because of the law and its practice that there is little
sense in considering the Central Act as a later State Act?
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approach is logically incorrect.

Then the question remains - what is left of the State Lart Approach that has any interpretative utili
whatsoever? The Approach suggests quite correctly that a Central law (passed under Article 252) should
prevail over a State law. "' For reasons to be given subsequently, this conclusion is correct. However, the
manner and

justification

of arriving at this correct conclusion, as highlighted above, is problematic. A

better way of arriving at the same conclusion is achieved by the Conarrrent FiddApprach. Therefore, the

Slate ListApproach has no practical utility other than being a circuitous way of justifyng, in the context of
Article 252, the pararnountcy of a Central law (passed under the Arnele 252 mechanism) over a State law.
Finalfr, the State irt Approach also has some practical difficulties. It does not appear to have received
serious judicial attention. In fact, it appears to have been mentioned only in passing and that too by a
decision of a High Court.'1 Also, it does not seem to have received the considered attention of the
Supreme Cout."' On die other hand, it has received express disapproval by a number of authorities."'

D

The Concurrent Field Approach

As stated earlier, in case of a conflict between a State law and a Central law, the issue is either resolved
through the determination of ie legislative competence of the respective Legislatures (discussed in the
SurrenderApproach) or by holding the State Law repugnant to the Central law to the extent of conflict.
The consequence is that the State law, to the extent of conflict, would generally be inoperative. However,
the principle of repugnancy as embodied in Artcle 254 is only apphcable in respect of matters contained
in the Concurrent List and not with respect to any other List.m Therefore, while the principle of
See Rangnw, sipr note 113, at 114 (para 22).
Even where [his approach has received udicial amenton it does not seem to be the primary reasoning for that decision. For
instance, in Rangma. snpm note 113, in tie same paragraph that Chinnappa Reddy, J., discusscs this approach, he discusses
another appioach - the CooairrtlFieldApproach.Further, the Stale Lirt Apprad is mentioned only enigmatically and the
learned Judge does not eider elaborte on the approach nor does he realise its full implications. The confusion seems to be
an authority In some of les subsequent cases, judges have cited
even more acte in subsequent cases that use Raglyse
this approach fim Rangya but in contradiction have also adopted the Surrndr 'Ipprarck Se. for instance. Thanti Ve kaah
Ab,A.I.R. 1980 SC 1568. Therefore, at best the Stae DLrApproarhamounts to secondary and supporting
V.Stateof AndhraPrad
reasoning for the courts and udges.

Linkab s State of Andhia
SAlthough Raeggy ups note 113, received judicial approval of the Supreme Court in Tiroaatird
Praeab, A.I.R. 19801 S.C. 1568, the Supreme Court decided that case on the basis of the SurrederApprod. The Supreme
Court does not seem to have recognised the differences in the line of its own reasoning and that of che Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Rasya.
For instance, iin Rashu Kwar v. Stale of Aadbya Pmwdes, A.LR. 1979 M.PR 108, 112 (pars 8) where G.P. Singh, C.J., notes
An Ar/pared b) PariamntundrArdsc 252()...caonnot, b any shieb of imragion br drxa#ed as a Sale A'..." .'r alsJAlI,
tep/rn note 27, at 647. According to Dr. Jain it would be fallacious to consider Parlimnen as a delegate of the State. He feels
the fact that onlh Parliament could amend or repeal the Act subsequent to its enactment was indicative that the State had
actually 'surrendered' the subject matters to Parliament. According to him, this was clear indication that the effect of a
resolution under Article 252 vwas a surrender and nor anything ese. The K macaki High Court, in T Khande Rao & Sows:
State of Karoalaka A.I.R. 1 979 Kat. 71, 78 (pars 15), per Puttaswany, J., has gone ta the extent of dismissing Ratgqy, aepm
P/. Lid. v. .fte of
note 113, as virtually amounting oper inafnsamin light of the Supreme Courts dictum in RAM.D.C (Ayson)t
Mysre, A.L. 1962,S.C. 594. While the Ranqa, hae m ay have been 'approved' by the Supreme Court, as discussed, sapr
note 118, there is SoMc conceptual confusion on the matter.
'

p9, KravarSharsmav. State of Karnataka,A.1.R. 1990 SC. 2072, Gxas Pancheolv. Mobinder F4 (1985) 3 S CC
661, HomltPbhanreeknstird
/Stairof Bar,(1983) 45.CC 45, 89-90; Ro!apya, sqprenore i13, at 113-114 (psra 2I-22); Keal
Se geemy I

Star Ekti4
Board vt.ldd/a Alminists Co., A.R. 1976 S.C. 1051; A.S. Kribna v State of Madras, A.LR. 1957 S.C. 297. A
matrs view is taken in, loo JERNINGs, Scare CnaaAcnaincs oF TiE INni.s CossnrunoN 61-h (1953).
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repugnancy is not diectly applicable in the context of Article 252, a similar principle would have to be
evolved in order to settle the legislative conflicts as well as to avoid some of the problems associated with
the approaches discussed earlier.
The Union Parliament and State Legislature have the competence to legislate on the same subject matter
in different ways. The fact that a matter has been enumerated in the Concurrent List is only one such
instance. Articles 249, 250, 252, and 253 permit the Parliament to legislate on matters normally mentioned
on the State List. Therefore, there exists the possibility of a 'Concurrent Field' in addition to a specifically
enumerated Concurrent List. "' Hence, it may be possible to consider that the subject matters dealt with
by the resolution of the State Legislature under Article 252 are transferred to the 'Concurrent Field'
instead of remaining in the State List or being surrendered to the Union List.
In many ways, the Concurrent Field is very much like the Concurrent List. Both the State and Centre
would have the legislative competence over matters in the Concurrent Field, -lowever, unlike in the case
of the Concurrent List where the principle of repugnancy is directly applicable, in the Concurrent Field
exemplified by Article 252, the paramountcy of a Central law over a State law will have to be inferred.
This inference of paramountcy can be justified on three grounds. Fintg the tenor of the Article seems
to suggest paramountcy. According to Chinnappa Reddy J.:
"anguage of the Article 'anyAct sopassed shall appy to such State' is pereptoy enough to
suggest that the Act xo passedshallpreaailoveranjother State Law..."12
Second, Article 252(2), in a clear departure from S. 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, prevents
the State from amending or repealing, on its own, an Act passed by Parliament in pursuance of an Article
252 resolution,"' According to the courts in Rangqyw and Das Gupta, this implied that the Central Act
would 'prevail' over the State Act to the extent of conflict between the two."' Thirdy, since Article 252
is modeled on S. 51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution,' 2 the interpretation adopted in Austraha
would have persuasive value in India as well. In Australia, when cooperative legislation is attempted and
where there is a conflict between the State and Commonwealth lawv the latter would prevail over the
former to the extent of the conflict.'2 This is akin to the principle of repugnancy under Article 254.
The Concmrrent FieldApproach has a number of advantages. Firsty, it recognizes that Article 252 holds a
"very special position"' in the Constitution. Conventional principles of Constitutional interpretation

Xeeereu/ly AN\[RLkI

PAso, CENTRE STATE RELAnoNs IN IIm:

CONSTITnIONAL PROVISONS, JUDICLAL REvIEWr -

RECENT

TRENos 184 (1985).
i22 See Ran.ya, vspm note 113, at 114 (para 22). Similar vicws were also expressed by A.M. BhattacharjeeJ., in Binfananda Dar
Gupra. Cwrpetentthoril, A.IR. 1988 Cal. 8, 13 (para7).
See Prakayk Chanae Tinwinv Slate of Madbyo Pradesh, AJ.R. 1976 M.E 50, 53 (para 8).
2

See Rraipei, sipranote 113, at 114 (para 22). See also Bimanak Dos Gupta v CompleniAMben

A.I.R. 1988 Cal. 8, 13 (pars

7).
. SuIrA RAG, T-F. FRAMING OF INDIA'S CONSTrITION: SrEcr Documews d 603 (1967). [hereinafter SHivA RAo, Stscr
-See3
DocmairsT] See also B. Si-ilA Rao, THE FRAMNic or INDIA'S CONSTInTIoNa A STnou 619 (1968) [hereinafter SHvA RaNo, A
STu-nj.

S.51(xxxvii) read with S.109 of the Australian Constitution.
1

See Ranrary, spmi note 113, at 114 (para 22). See alraBireraredaDas Gupa v CompetenAuetbodl AIR 1988 Cal. 8, 13 (para
7). See as the observations of Mahajan, J., in ReArick 143, Cons/ikon of lui &DehW La sAa (1912), A.IR. 1951 S.C
332, 388 (para 188)
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such as legislative competence, repugnancy, or occupied field may not be directly applicable. In fact
Article 252 may itself amount to a complete code with respect to its interpretadon."' Second, the Concurrent
FiddApproachavoids the possibility of gridlock as possible in the SurenderApproach.The subject matter
transferred is, at all times within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. In terms of the
hypothetical Indian Constitution, if Parliament fails to legislate on subject matters C and D despite a
resolution by the State Legislature, the State Legislature would be well within its legislative power to
legislate with respect to those subjects" However, where there is a conflict with a Central Law (enacted
under the Article 252 mechanism),"" the State law would become void to that extent only. Thirdl, unlike
the StateListApproach, there would be no necessity to evolve separate set of principles of interpretation
for dealing with subjects on the Concurrent Field as the principles applicable to the Concurrent List
would be applicable here as well.
Final, some writers feel that the Constituent Assembly intended that Article 252 be interpreted in the
same manner as its corresponding section in the Australian Constitution. In Australia, the interpretation
of cooperative legislation is similar to the ConcurrentFieldApproach" On the flip side however, despite
the obvious merits of this approach it has not received serious judicial attention and approval?
V

Does Parliament Have to Legislate in respect of a Resolution Passed by the State
under Article 252?

As has been discussed earlier, the dominant view taken by the courts has been that once a resolution
under Article 252 has been passed, the States are divested of their legislative powers to that extent. Only
Parliament is now competent to legislate on those matters. As a corollary, one needs to ask whether
Parliament must pass legislation with respect to those subject matters surrendered to it. Similarly would
Parliament hae to pass an amending or repealing Act in line with the wishes of the State Legislatures
under Article 252(2)? The further question that arises is whether Parliament is bound to adopt the aiews of
the States with regard to that legislation or its subsequent amendment under Article 252(2)?
There are two conflicting strands of thought on this issue. The first line of thinking comes from a livel
debate in the Constituent Assembly on Draft Article 229 (precursor to Article 252). It was argued by the
Hon'ble Mr. K. Santhanam that Draft Article 229 was a "noose" from which "States cannot get out at

See Rangiya, srpra note 113, at 114.
1'

See Rangay
1 a, supr note 113. See generag R.M.D.C. (Myerr) ,Pe Lid a State of Aysore, Alt.R. 1962 S.C. 594.

'

JaianMohinedn a Goa. of Andhra Pradexb, A.IR. 2002 A.R. 105, 107-108 (para 9), L Narasinaha Reddy, J., neotes,
In, Al
"-once the Logisle of a Sal passes a rarobtiaon as antrplatedunder Arlicle 252(1), aid the Parliamentenads a losr it (lhe Slate
IUgislaare) lone its powerio aend orrepealhather.."(emphasis supplied). However, this observation appears to be ebier dia
as it was unnecessary to decide the case, which revolved around a repealing Act not a situation involving the power of
legislation of a State Legislature.

m

See SPIvA RAO, SFTF.CT Docuisms, sprv note 125, at 603. See air SHivA Rta, A ST-mv, supra note 125, at 619. The Australian
concept of 'referred but not transferred' has already been discussed in earlier sections of this paper.
As stated earlier, there only two case that seems to suggest this approach and that too haltingly. In the Rangqea case, rrora
note 113, Chinnappa Reddy, J., used this approach in conjunction with the State Uut Approach. The learned Judge neither
laborated his views nordid he appear to realise the Flsl import of the reasoning that he had adopted. Even in BirafanandaoDas
Gap/a v. Compeent Aethon A LR. 1988 Cal, 8, 13 (pars 7), Bhstacharjee, J., adopts this approach only as an alternative
reasoning to the SuirrenderAppoeath. Also in,AlA SaAn Mobinddin a Golt.of Andbra Pradeb,A-I.R. 2002 A.E 105, statements
supporting such an approach tray be considered purely oeb/rn
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all" because even if "all te Staes concerned anaed the law to be amended or repeaed," the Parliament would not
be bound co do o.113 In his reply, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Chairman of the Drafting Committee) stated that
if the States, by resolution desired such an amending or repealingAct (which other States may subsequently
adopt), "Parliament wold he bound to do rn" The priMafaeaeinference from this debate suggests that the
Parliament would be boundro legislate, amend, or repeal the Acts based upon the resolution of the States.
This inference, however, may not be correct in light of the discussion below
There are a number of objections to the inference that Parliament is bound to legislate in pursuance of a
resolution under Article 252. At the outset, it appears that the debate was centered on the amendment
and repeal of the Central Act and there appears to be no comment on whether the legislation was
required to be initially passed by Parliament. It also appears that the Hon'ble Member was talking about
a situation where althe States where the Central Act was in operation wanted an amendment or repeal.
However, Dr. Ambedkar's response and the current unambiguous wording of Article 252 requires any
two of the States where the Act was operative to'request' its amendment or repeal. There is no requirement
that allthe concerned States should pass such a resolution. Furter even after the debate, Article 252(1)
still has the terminology (it) "shall be lawful" for Parliament to legislate. According to some writers, this
lack of unequivocal mandatoriness in the phraseology of the provision indicates that Parliament is not
bound to legislate on the matters surrendered to it? 3
Final, if Parliament was bound to pass the legislation, amend, or repeal it, it would run contrary to the
concept of plenary power of the Legislature with respect to its power of legislation." No motive or
extraneous purpose can be attributed to a legislative body when it acts (or does not act) in pursuance of
its legislative functions. 13 ' Furthermore, there can no remedy in any court of law to compel Parliament to
pass legislation in pursuance of a resolution of a State Legislature. In fact, it has been held that as a
general principle no writ can lie against the Legislature even to compel it to introduce a Bill in the
House,"" let alone enact it as legislation. Therefore, for all the above reasons the opinions expressed in
the Constituent Assembly Debates may not be conclusive of the position that Parliament/Centre is
bound to legislate in pursuance of States' resolutions under Article 252As a comllary to the aforementioned points, even if Parliament does initiate such legislation, it would
not, technically speaking, be bound to consult the States with regard to its exact content and structure.
Any conditions or limitations in the resolution of the States passed under Article 252(1) cannot bind the
Centre in any way when it proposes to act upon such a resolution."' While the States can prevent the
initiation of the amending Act (by not passing the required resolution under Article 252(2)), they would

in

The vews expressed by the Hon'blc K Santhtam in the debate on Draft Article 229 (precursor to Article 252), CAD, VIII,
itsprnote 20, at 812.
JAL. SiLacr

IssLis, sira note 83, at 133-134.

See MIRF Lid v Jsper Kerah Goia, (1998) 8 S C.C. 227. Seeakho S
UmgngSigb v State of BmDayy, AI.R. 1955 S.C. 540.
Seegeneral/ K Notrnjv.State of Audin Praks, (1985)

IS

inesa That v Goe, of TaIPNadk (1992) 2 &C.C. 643

C. 523.

See Stat -ofJau
&Karhry AR11 ZA
1992 SuppR (1) &CC 548; St
mswrv LsAv 42 -438 (1999)
S.CC 169. iSeeernlly'S.E Sarme. Ao
Uio" of lndioa

of

Himwrba/Pradesh %jParma of a

"B. Chowwbry A.iR. 1979 SC 1415, 1425 (psr 31)_ See DArsa, rnpra note 71, at 900.

90,

Sndent. (1983) 3
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have no control over Lhe exact format of the amendment (or for that matter over the original Act). This
creates an anomalous situation where the Parliament would not he able to amend the Central Act (because
the States have not passed the required resolution) and the States would not get the amendments they
desire (because Parliament is not bound to consult them). There are numerous instances where the Stares
and the Centre have not been able to arrive at a consensus on bow and in what form to amend legislation
passed under Article 252.'" Thus, the very essence of 'coperafion,' as envisaged by Article 252 is
undermined.
There are possibly two solutions for this problem. The Sarkaria Commission felt that the Inter-State
Council should be consulted to iron out the modalities of the amendment."' However, as stated earlier,
the Inter-State Council does not appear to have been very effective in it's functioning. In the alternative,
the Australian provisions, upon which the Indian provision is said to be modeled," can be considered.
In Australia, the States can impose conditions in their delegation that will bind the Commonwealth
Parliament when it proposes -to initiate the legislation or subsequently amend it""
Finalb, there is yet another serious problem which has been discussed in detail earlier This is the possibility
of legislative gridlock between the Centre and the States on sensitive political issues such as cow-slaughter
ban. Since the Centre is not bound to pass a law on the request of the States, there can arise a situation
where the States cannot legislate on a legislative subject and the Centre would not be wifling to do so.

Can States Recall the Power 'Transferred' to Parliament?

VI

As stated earlier, the most widely accepted approach to interpreting Article 252 is the SixrrrnderApprad.
Here the subject matter covered by the resolution of the States is abdicated' to the Centre and the States
have no legislative control over these subjects. As explained in the previous section, the States have little
or no control over the manner in which this legislative power is exercised by the Centre. The question
whether States can 'recall' the suhects that they surrendered to the Centre, assumes great importance in
tijs context. If it is answered in the negative, it would imply that Article 252 creates a permanent change
in federal legislative relations between the Centre and the States. This, it is submitted, would virtually
nount to a constitutional amendment without complyingwnth the constitutionally prescribed procedure'
and public scrutiny normally attached to such an amending process under Article 368. This would he an
unfortunate result for what was originally envisaged as a mutually beneficial device fur both the Centre

and the States.

See SaIAnn CoSSaIon QursnMONNAIR., s:ora note 88, at 40 where the Commission highlights the difficulty in amending
the Estate Duy Acc, 1953 and the Urban Land CeilingAct, 1976 on account of 'qualified,"'hedged'ar 'discordani conditions'

in the comments of the States.
Id. Sergeneraf4

Base, CoL"WaNTARY,

sapro note 16, at 131

"2

SffSHvA RAO, Stancr DocuMEaNTs, xapn note 125, at
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I. V.Pibff
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GD3.

See aho SnvA RAO, A Smu,

sdpra note 125, at

619.

Tbenal expAsraradnNaionalAhnns, (1964) 113 C.L.R. 207; JoNsoN, ipr note

,at68-

71.
Article 368 of the Indian Consuution provides a special procedure and deliberately cumbersome procedure for amending
of some parts of the Consuration such as the redisuibudon of legislative powers through an amendment of the With
Schedule. This involves: (i) The anriending Bill being passed by a majority of the total membership of the each house of
Parliamenrt and (ii) such majority being not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting of each of the Houses;
(iii) Ratifeation by Legislarures of not less than half of the States; and (iv) Presidential assent to the amending Biil.
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'Recall' can be understood in two senses: thefirst being whether the central legislation enacted under
Article 252(1) can be made inoperative while the secondis whether the State can recall the subject matter
transferred and replace it for all practical purposes in the State List. The first sense is provided for in
Article 252(2) itself The procedure for repeal/amendment is identical to the procedure requesting a
common legislation-namely a resolution of the State Legislature requesting amendment or repeal and
then a subsequent legislation by Parliament.145 In addition, an amending or repealing Act passed by
Parliament can be subsequently adopted by a resolution of the State Legislature." By only these two
means a legislation passed under Article 252 can be amended or repealed. In this way Article 252 is
different from S. 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which provided that a Provincial Legislature
could subsequently amend or repeal the legislation." Even then, it must be reiterated that Parliament
is not bound to pass the repealing or amending Act as requested by a resolution of the State under
Article 252.
The secondaspect of recall is whether the subject matter referred to in the resolution can be subsequently
restored to the exclusive legislative domain of the State. In terms of the hypothetical Indian Constitution,
while Article 252(2) clearly allows for the repeal of the Central CD Act, 20xx (through the procedure
discussed above), does Article 252 allow the State to subsequently legislate exclusively on matters C and
D, which were originally in the State List? In other words, could the States ever pass a State CD Act, 2Qxx,
which would then be treated on par with any other State statute? Despite the obvious advantages of
answering this irt the affirmative, it is submitted that this is not possible for three reasons.
At the very outset there is nothing in the wording of Article 252 that suggests such a possibility. Article
252(2) specifically refers to amendment or repeal of the Central Act ('Recall'in thefirstsense)but makes
no mention of the matters being returned to the State List ('Recall' in the secondsense). Enabling 'recalF in
the second sense would require a clear procedural mechanism as is provided for 'recall' in the first sense.
There is evidently no such mechanisrn The debates in the Constituent Assembly also recognized the
possibility of Article 252 creating a permanent change in legislative relations between the Centre and the
States. 1" Despite this apprehension, amendments to the Draft Article only suggested changes to the
aspects on amendment and repeal procedure in Article 252, and not to the aspects pertaining to the recall
of the subject matter. Finally, Article 252, at least as per the Constituent Assembly debates, is modeled on
the corresponding provisions in the Australian Constitution.'" Therefore, the Australian position on this
question becomes relevant. In Australia, it has been felt by some authorities that where the Federal
Parliament, on delegation or reference to it, has passed a legislation; the State cannot revoke the reference.

'

Arricle 252(2).

"'

Article 252(2). Jee 74o AA. Suk/an Mobsiddn v Gosr of Andnm Pradub, A.I.R. 2002 A.? 105,
See Pakab Chanrd Tisi v. Sthe of Madb_7a Pradeh, AIR. 1976 M.P 50, 53 (para 8) where the distinction between the two
provisions is discussed.

"'

'
''

The views expressed by the Hon'ble K Santhanam in the debate on Draft Article 229 (precursor to Article 252), CAD, VIII,
spra note 20. at 812.

St SIvA RAO, SFiFacr DocuriNms, spranote 125, at 603. Sewalso Sirva RAo, A Sray, aorm note 125, at 619.
See JowNso, opra note 1, at 69. However, this proposition seems to be the minority view in Australia, the predominant
opinion being that a revocation of a reference is possible.
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VII Conclusion
The challenge for any cooperative legislative mechanism in a federal constitution lies in balancing the
need for an effective common legislation and protecting the sovereignty of the States within their own
legislative domain. I was felt as early as in the Constituent Assembly Debates, that cooperative legislation
as envisaged in Article 252 had the potentialof becoming a "oorearoundtheState?" h is submitted that
this apprehension has become a reality. Article 252 in effect provides for a permanent change in legislative
relations between the Centre and the States. The scales have been tilted so heavily in favour of the Centre
so as to question some basic conceptions of Indian federalism. There is, therefore, the need to address
this imbalance. There are four concerns and correspondingly four proposals for reform.
Thefirstissue arises with respect to the mannerinwbich the States express the need for a uniform legislation.
Article 252(1) requires a mere 'resolution' to be passed by the State Legislature. Indian courts have held
that this resolution is an 'act of legislature' rather than a 'legislative act,' with only the latter requiring the
assent of the GovernorA As has been highlighted earlier, a resolution under Article 252(l) results in a
permanent change in federal legislative relations between the Centre and the States. Therefore, what is
normallv done by a cumbersome process and public scrutiny i.e. a constitutional amendment is being
achieved by a mere resolution of the State Legislature. On the other hand, Article 252 was intended to
provide for speedy action on part of the States and the Centre and therefore, a cumbersome constitutional
amendment process as envisaged in Article 368 may not be appropriate. Then how does one balance
these competing interests? It is submitted that the Australian Constitution has achieved the correct balance
between the need for speedy action and adherence to proper procedure, In Australia, a delegation to the
Commonwealth Parliament requires a legislative Act by the concerned State Legislature and not a mere
resolution." Therefore, Article 252 should be amended to require the State Legislature to pass an Act
rather than a mere resolution to effectuate the initiation of the Central Act.
The secondissue arises with respect to legislative relations between the Centre and the States with respect
to the subject matter of the State resolution. The current interpretation of Article 252 provides that a
resolution 'surrenders' the subject matters to the Union List and the States would have no legislative
competence whatsoever with respect to those subjects. This judicial interpretation also appears to have
tilted the constitutional balance in favour of the Centre. The possibility for a legislative gridock, especially
since Parliament is not bound to legislate, has already been highlighted. This concern is further heightened
with respect to politically sensitive subjects such as the proposed Cow-Slaughter Bill, which is to be
enacted through the Article 252 mechanism.M The remedy for this problem is relatively simple and has
already been hinted at by a number of court decisions most notably in the Ranggya case. The application
of the Concurret FiedApproach would allow both the Centre and States to legislate on subject matters
referred to in the resolution. There can be no possibility of a legislative gridlock. In the event of a
legislative clash the Central Act would prevail over the State Act to the extent of the conflict.
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The third issue arises with respect to the amendment or repeal of the Central Act. As discussed earlier,
the Parliament is not bound to initiate the legislation or repeal it- The Parliament is also not bound to
accept the recommendations of the States with regard to the phraseology and content of the legislations.
Itis submitted that this position is correct. Parliament should not be bound to legislate merely because a
resolution has been passed by the States as that would impinge on its plenary powers of legislation. Yet
at the same time there is no possihility of a legislative gridlock because if the Concurrent.FieldApproach
reasoning is adopted, the States can always legislate if the Parliament has not legislated on the subjects on
which a common law was desired (and resolutions were passed). However, the Parliament should be
required to comnelt the later-State Council on the content and phraseology of the legislations or its
amendment."' This proposal would also require an amendment to Article 252.
The fourth and final issue is whether the States can recall the resolution and for all practical purposes
replace the subject matters within the State List ('Recall'in the second sense). Article 252(2) only provides
for a repeal of the Central Act and not for a recall of legislative power ('Recall' in the first sense). As
stated earlier, Article 252 shouald not provide for a permanent change in federal legislative powers without
the process of constitutional amendment envisaged in Article 368. At the same time, if the powers
transferred to the Centre could be prematurely recalled by the States, the interest of an effective common
legislation would not be served. A balance needs to be struck between these two positions. Therefore, the
transfer should be for a fixed period of time after which the subject matters would revert back to the
State List. 6 If the States desire the continuance of the Central Act, they should pass the required
resolution calling for the continuance, before the recall happens.

pro note 88, at 40.
at 40 where the Commission suggested that the Central Act should only baves
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note 78.
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